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INTRODUCTION 
 
The conversations about fiscal federalism, decentrali-
zation and devolution have been evolving in the literature 
since the second half of the 20th century. In the United 
States and all around the world, the matter of governance 
and decentralization are on the agenda. Decentralization 
has been seen as the main institutional framework, and is 
widely believed to provide benefits. “It is often suggested 
as a way of reducing the role of the state in general, by 
fragmenting central authority and introducing more 
intergovernmental competition, and checks and balances. 
In a world of rampant ethnic conflicts and separatist 
movements, decentralization is also regarded as a way of 
diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring 
cultural and political autonomy” (Bardhan, 2002). The 
idea of giving more fiscal authority to local governments 
is attractive; competition between jurisdictions is believed 
to minimize inefficiency, force local representatives to 
respond better to their constituents and give more for tax 
dollars paid. The individual, under conditions of de-
centralization and interjurisdictional mobility has more 
power over government; as public authority moves down 
to the lower levels the individual is better exposed to 
competition and choice, and can “vote with his feet”.  
This paper aims to find the routes of fiscal federalism 
by first understanding what is meant by federalism, as it 
does not simply refer to a form of governance, then laying 
out the classical foundations of this theory (trumped by 
Wallace Oates), and followed by some departures from 
the classical thoughts into some new streams of literature 
on the matter. The discourse around fiscal federalism 
becomes important in times where politically, countries 
are strengthening the powers of the executive, and when 
the administrative state has changed so much. It is the 
hope that this paper will clarify what fiscal federalism is 
and consider whether such a reform is beneficial.  
 
 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
   
Before we can discuss the relevance of fiscal federalism, 
let us first decipher what is meant by federalism. Elazar 
(1972) offers a definition for federa-lism. He claims that it 
can be defined as “the mode of political organization that 
unites separate polities within an overarching political 
system by distributing power among general and 
constituent governments in a manner designed to protect 
the existence and authority of both. In its simplest form, 
federalism means national unification through the 
maintenance of sub-national systems. In a large sense, it 
is a mode of political activity that requires the extension 
of certain kinds of cooperative relationships throughout 
any political system it animates” (2-3). The federal 
system was created with the intention of combining the 
different advantages which result from the magnitude and 
littleness of nations (De Toqueville, 1980). Let us briefly 
discuss the set-up of such a multi-tier government. In the 
Rawlsian “original position” legislators formulate a 
constitution, which in this context would be a set  of  rules 
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by which to govern public projects. The social objective is 
simply to maximize the expected net value of a project 
and the welfare. Hierarchy, is thus justified only if it 
generates positive social benefits to cover the costs of 
having another tier, only if welfare is improved and 
justified to add tiers under the central unit. The decision 
for or against decentralization depends on those rules the 
central legislature formulated for guidance and operations 
(Rubinchick-Pessach, 2005).  
Numerous problems arise in such a system where one 
central financial authority contains constitutionally 
independent financial units within it (under it). In 
federalism, two of such financial systems operate based 
on the resources provided by the individual citizens. Each 
unit of government is operationally limited by its specific 
geographical boundaries and is dependant only on the 
resources provided by those within its area for the 
provision of public services. Subordinate units, if required 
to provide certain functions independently will end up with 
fiscal inequalities between them unless the fiscal 
capacities between units is equivalent (Buchanan, 1950).  
This foundation of what a federation means allows us 
now to move forward in our progress towards what fiscal 
federalism is. According to Musgrave (1965) the 
traditional approach of fiscal theory was in the context of 
a unitary government. The general theory of taxation and 
expenditure was seen in unitary terms at first, following 
Keynes’ theory that changed the focus more toward 
government finance for stabilization; yet no discussion of 
hierarchical fiscal units or multi level finance was yet 
introduced. Yet in the United States where the fiscal 
structure is highly decentralized traditional forms of 
finance had to be revisited; this involves both political and 
economic reinterpretations of fiscal federalism. “There 
are good theoretical reasons for reorientation of fiscal 
thinking in multi-unit terms. The very theory of social 
wants remains at the core of fiscal economics. Certain 
wants cannot be satisfied through the market, but must 
be provided for by government because the resulting 
benefits accrue to all members of the “group” 
independent of individual contributions. Membership in 
the group, however, fre-quently depends of spatial 
considerations” (Musgrave, 1965). What Musgrave is 
directing our attention to is that certain types of public 
services concern a certain region or locality; thus 
supplying goods and services that should serve the 
needs and preferences as reflected by certain 
communities or regional units. We must also remember 
that these units may not be homogenous within a region 
and are heterogeneous by the nature of individuals being 
different from one another. “It follows from the nature of 
social goods that services are consumed in relatively 
equal amounts by members of a beneficiary group. Since 
the cost is shared among the members, it is the interest 
of the individual to associate with others whose 
preferences for social goods are similar to his own” (3). 
Musgrave’s   short   introduction,   and    this   particular 
 
 
 
 
argument link the conversation to Tiebout (1956) famous 
piece which makes an important foundational argument 
on which fiscal federalism will rest its blocks. Who then 
sets out to show that the arguments made by Musgrave 
(1965) in applied economic theory “market type” that 
solution is not applicable to the determination of 
expenditure on public goods, that is national income 
allocated non-optimally is not applicable when speaking 
of local expenditures. Tiebout argues that local 
expenditures are not only at the central level; actually 
they are quite significant at the local levels. He posits that 
an individual will pick the community which best suits his 
patter of preference of public goods. “The greater the 
number of communities and the greater variance among 
them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing 
his preference position” (Baker and Elliott, 1990). In the 
Tiebout model households are highly mobile, and they 
“vote with their feet”, that is they choose where to reside 
based on what locality provides the fiscal package that 
would best fit their tastes and preferences. Tiebout 
(1956) further claims in his article that the policies that 
promote mobility and increase the consumers’ knowledge 
will improve governmental expenditure allocation. Given 
full mobility of consumer-voters, “The solution, like the 
general equilibrium solution for private spatial economy, 
is the best that can be obtained given preferences and 
resource endowments” (Baker and Elliott, 1990). In fiscal 
federalism, where the provision of public goods is in the 
hands of sub-national governments tailored to the 
preferences of a heterogeneous population, is beneficial 
from the Tiebout model point of view. The outcome is 
individuals sorted into demand-homogenous jurisdictions 
which provide different amounts of public goods based on 
the preferences of each of these groups of individuals. At 
this point some main foundations have been set down 
and we can proceed with the specifics of classical fiscal 
federalism.  
 
 
Classical fiscal federalism 
  
On this part the author will mainly depend on the work of 
Oates as he is the main classical writer on this issue. In 
the introduction to his book, fiscal federalism he states 
that his study rests on Musgrave (1959) conceptuali-
zation of the role of the public sector. From Musgrave’s 
perspective that a free market economy without a 
government sector is likely to malfunction, Oates comes 
to an understanding that the public sector has three 
primary economic problems; equitable distribution, 
maintaining stabilization and efficient pattern of resource 
allocation, these problems are interrelated. What Oates 
sets to achieve is a case of federalism, for that purpose 
he provides a comparative discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of having a completely centralized 
government versus a highly decentralized form of 
government (Oates, 1972). 
  
 
 
 
A unitary form of government is much more capable 
than a decentralized government of meeting its economic 
responsibilities of stabilization, realizing equitable 
distribution of income and provision of efficient levels of 
output of public goods. Yet, the decentralized govern-
ments also have some advantages over its counterpart. 
They provide for public goods consumption tailored more 
to the preferences of the constituents of the locality, and 
by promoting increased innovation and competition of 
local governments decentralization might increase 
efficiency in the production of public goods. Lastly, a 
system of local governments might provide for better 
public decision making, by compelling more recognition 
of the costs of public goods and services. Oates then 
suggests that we combine the advantages of both 
systems of governance under a federal organization, as 
this represents a compromise. The central government is 
responsible for the stabilization of the economy, for 
achievement of equitable distribution of income and for 
providing certain public goods that influence the welfare 
of all the members of the society. Its sub-entities will 
supply those public goods and services that are of 
interest to the residents of the specific jurisdiction (Oates, 
1972; Baker and Elliott, 1990). 
As Oates indicates, there is a difference between the 
economic and the political science meaning of 
federalism. His suggestion is the use of an economic 
definition; this is due to the economists’ concerns are 
pattern of resource use and income distribution. 
Decentralization provides a mechanism where levels of 
public goods provision can be tailored to individual 
preferences; the economist’s concern is merely that 
decisions regarding levels of provision reflect the 
interests of the constituents. Therefore, Oates defines 
federalism economically as;  
 
“Federal Government: a public sector with both 
centralized and decentralized levels of decision 
making in which choices made at each level 
concerning the provision of public services are 
determined largely by the demand for these 
services of the residents of (and perhaps others 
who carry on activities in) the respective 
jurisdiction” (Oates, 1972). 
 
To the economist constitutional structure assumes 
importance only to the degree that it affects respon-
siveness of the provision of local services to the local 
preferences (Stegarescu, 2005). Most importantly in 
Oates’ view, most if not all systems are federal, from an 
economic perspective; the public sector of all countries 
could be federal and the distinction is only in the degree 
of centralization (Oates, 1972; Baker and Elliott, 1990). 
The presentation of Oates’ main article and claims are 
important to comprehend because a lot of the sub-
sequent literature on the subject in following years made 
reference to his assertions. In a later  piece  Oates (1999) 
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provides the brief points most pertinent to the basic 
theory of fiscal federalism. The hope in advocating for 
fiscal federalism (decentralization) is that as local 
governments are closer to the people they will better 
know and address the people’s preferences, and will 
have an ability to find innovative new ways to provide 
goods and services to the constituents of the sub units 
(jurisdictions). Yet the goal of restructuring the public 
sector is not only decentralization, but rather an 
alignment if governmental responsibilities and fiscal 
instruments with the proper level of government. The 
central question of fiscal federalism is which functions 
and instrument are suited for central government and 
which to the levels of that government?  
As we have outlined the functions of government 
earlier, a main point according to Oates is that efficient 
levels of local outputs at the local levels will likely vary 
across jurisdictions due to differing costs and 
preferences; if we are to maximize social welfare, local 
outputs will have to vary. The main basic principle of 
fiscal decentralization is that provision of public services 
should be located at the lowest level of government 
encompassing spatial relevant costs and benefits. 
 
The decentralization theorem, “in the absence of 
cost-saving from the centralized provision of a 
good and of interjurisdictional external effects, 
the level of welfare will always be at least as 
high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient 
levels of consumption of the good are provided 
in each jurisdiction than in any single, uniform 
level of consumption is maintained across all 
jurisdictions. In this way the theorem 
establishes, in the absence of other kinds of 
offsetting benefits from centralized control, a 
presumption in favor of decentralized finance” 
(Oates, 1972). 
 
The theorem rests if grounds of economic efficiency 
and simply presumes that centralized provision will entail 
uniform level of output across all jurisdictions. Yet there is 
an inherent assumption regarding access to information. 
Oates (1999) observes that there is a knowledge 
asymmetry, presumably the local level possess more 
information regarding individual preferences and cost 
conditions. Also, at the central level there is political 
pressure that constrains its ability to provide higher levels 
of services to some places and not others. And here he 
states a major assumption in his theory that constraints 
on central government tend to require a degree of 
uniformity in provision; the constraints prevent central 
government from providing optimal pattern of local 
outputs. Another important assumption of the theory is 
that the magnitude of welfare gains depends on the 
heterogeneity in demands across the jurisdictions and 
interjurisdictional differences in costs (1123). Oates 
(1999) also  observes  that  gains  from   decentralization, 
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although enhanced by mobility, are not wholly dependent 
on mobility. He finds that even when there is no mobility 
the efficient levels of outputs of “local” public goods will 
typically vary across jurisdictions (1124). In the creation 
of his model it is important to note that Oates (1972) 
assumes that each government maximizes the surplus of 
the aggregate constituents, yet there is a possible 
problem in local provision and that is not paying attention 
to benefit spillovers to other districts. Another assumption 
mentioned earlier is that a centralized system 
government provides uniform level of spending which 
cannot address local individual preferences. 
The earlier discussed paragraphs attempted to give a 
brief review of the main relevant points that describe what 
fiscal federalism is about. Yet there are a lot of issues 
tied and related to the basic tenets of the theory. Most of 
the literatures in one way or another beg to determine 
whether decentralization is actually beneficial and if so in 
what ways is it advantageous to centralization. 
Shadbegian (1999) studies the validity of three theories 
concerning public sector spending. Grossman and West 
(1994) have also researched these hypotheses regarding 
government expenditure.  
 
 
THREE HYPOTHESES REGARDING LEVELS OF 
GOVENRMENT SPENDING 
 
The Wallis hypothesis 
 
Increased fiscal decentralization would lead to bigger 
state and local governments. “since individuals have 
more control over public decisions at the local level than 
at the state of national level, they will wish to empower 
the public sector with a wider range of functions and 
responsibility where these activities are carried out at 
more localizes levels of government” (Oates, 1985). His 
argument is based on the possibility of transferring 
governmental functions and responsibilities from the 
higher to the lower level of government. If indeed they are 
transferable than as decisions become decentralized, 
higher levels of government will spend less while lower 
levels will spend more (Shadbegian, 1999; Grossman 
and West, 1994). 
 
 
The Brennan/Buchanan hypothesis 
 
Budgetary decisions conform to the revenue maximizing 
monolithic government, Leviathan and not to the median 
voter. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that the 
greater the level of decentralization the higher the level of 
competition among jurisdiction; the smaller the share of 
aggregate government expenditure. “Total government 
intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris 
paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and 
expenditures are decentralized” (185) (Shadbegian, 1999;  
 
 
 
 
Grossman and West, 1994). 
 
 
Brennan/Buchanan collusion hypothesis 
 
It is possible that as decentralization occurs, the 
component governments in a federal system are 
colluding and forming a cartel, which dampens the 
competitive influence of decentralization to expand the 
budget. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) note that the 
possibility for collusion should be included in the “all 
things being equal” (185) and that it is expected that in a 
federal decentralized system there would be pressure on 
the lower levels of government due to the high levels of 
competition to secure arrangements and moderate 
competitive pressures (182). This argument has two 
testable implications: total government size will and 
ceteris paribus, increase with the level of collusion and 
the size of each level of government will and ceteris 
paribus, increase as the level of collusion increases 
(Shadbegian, 1999; Grossman and West, 1994). 
Now that we have outlined these three very important 
hypotheses regarding government spending, based on 
the two articles earlier, many research efforts have been 
put forward to test these three hypotheses in the 
literature. Due to time constrains the writer will present 
the findings as they are articulated in the articles. 
Shadbegian (1999) tested the validity in order to suggest 
a model for the United States. The results show that the 
hypotheses complement one another and contribute to 
understanding of size of government. Using state level 
panel data the author was able to prove each one of the 
hypotheses. 
Grossman and West (1994) were able to find in their 
empirical study simultaneous support for the Wallis 
hypothesis, as greater power passes down closer to the 
citizenry they are more willing to grant those 
governments a broader range of powers. As for the first 
Leviathan hypothesis, the authors found support and that 
federal share of aggregate spending decreases while 
local share increases with decentralization, and they also 
were able to support the collusion argument. Both articles 
conclude that decentralization by itself is not a strong 
enough constraint on the Leviathan, since competitive 
pressures of fiscal federalism are offset by collusion 
among all levels of government.  
 
 
IS FISCAL FEDERALISM BENEFICIAL OR NOT? 
 
While the basic arguments of fiscal federalism and aswe 
have seen thus far the answer whether decentralization is 
beneficial or not as a policy is not so simple. Much 
literature has addressed this issue from many different 
angles, basic economic models were used and new 
models for federalism have been offered. A short review 
of this issue is offered in this part of the work. At the offset  
  
 
 
 
it seems that there are many political, social and 
economic factors that should be considered in addressing 
the issue of decentralization, yes or no? 
The decision whether to decentralize or not depends on 
the constitutional definitions designed by legislature. This 
is true not just for the Unites States, but for whatever 
country is considering decentralization. Decentralization 
is a complex process and a product of many factors, as 
has been stated and including cultural heritage and 
geography. In an important study, Pannizza (1999) starts 
out by pointing that across countries there are different 
institutional arrangements and different levels of centrali-
zation. He sets to identify empirical regularities to explain 
cross-country differences in the levels of centralization; 
the findings indicate that country size, per capita income, 
ethnic fractionalization and level of democracy are 
negatively correlated with fiscal centralization. Building on 
Panizza’s model and testing fiscal decentralization within 
a country Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) hypothesize 
that the degree of variation of institutional and fiscal 
decentralization across countries is explained by basic 
economic and demographic variables. What they find is 
that per capital income, population, land area and 
population concentration in large cities largely affects 
decentralization. Income and population growth lead to 
decentralization along with population decentralization. 
Economic and demographic growth processes explain 
the variation in centralization. They also note that 
constitutional federalism encourages effective federalism 
and fiscal decentralization. 
Wallis and Oates (1988) historically view the evolution 
of fiscal decentralization in the state and local sector. 
They view and test empirically different theories to 
explain differences in fiscal decentralization.  
 
“We found that the extent of fiscal centralization 
varies inversely and significantly with population 
size and urbanization, we have found a positive 
relationship between fiscal centralization and the 
level of per capital income” (Rosen, 1988). 
Pannizza, and Arzaghi and Henderson indicate 
that the correlation between income per capital 
and centralization is inversely. 
 
“Our overall econometric results point to these 
divergent forces. If population and urbanization 
continue to grow, this will create pressures for 
more decentralizes government” (Rosen, 1988). 
 
Besley and Coate (2003) preserve the uniform cost 
sharing for public projects, but relax Oates’ assumption 
regarding uniform public spending across regions. In their 
models they see central governments as comprising of 
locally elected representatives; doing this required 
modeling the behavior of the representatives and 
districts’ choices about the type of representative to elect.  
Their  findings  suggest  that  detailed  modeling  of  the  
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political decision making is important to understanding 
the trade-offs between centralization and decentrali-
zation. Heterogeneity and spillovers are correctly at the 
heart of the debate about the gains from centralization.  
Earlier studies are few among many empirical studies 
that tackle the question of decentralization. As 
demonstrated, the finding point generally that under 
specific assumptions and using specific data sets there is 
evidence to support the advantage of fiscal federalism. 
But each study also points to its limitations and especially 
to differences across nations.  
The literature points to gains and benefits; such as 
faster economic growth (Brueckner, 2006), but also to 
some drawbacks of federalism, such as sacrificing 
economies of scale and losses from interjurisdictional tax 
competition when revenues come from a mobile tax base 
and an inability to properly account for spillovers, just to 
name a few.  
In rethinking federalism by Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) 
start off by saying that in the United States the resolution 
of tension of which level of government should play what 
function has been evolving for the past two centuries; 
from “dualism” (1790 to1860) where states and central 
governments had comparable responsibilities; through 
“centralizing federalism” (1860 to 1933) where the federal 
responsibilities grew moderately; to “cooperative 
federalism” (1933 to1964) marking substantial growth of 
social programs resulting from the depression; and since 
a period of “creative federalism” where federal 
government takes direct and active role in problems of 
lower level governments (43-44).  
In lieu of a trend in the US fiscal structure toward 
centralization that the authors foresee the present three 
common principles of federalism; economic, cooperative 
and democratic federalisms.  
They conclude that,  
 
“Rethinking federalism means rethinking the terms under 
which sovereign citizens or states join together to form a 
“more perfect union”. Whether one is struggling to form a 
political union for the first time…deciding to break away 
from an existing union…or to reform a stable one, 
decisions must be made along each of the institutional 
dimensions which define the federal constitution: the 
number of lower-tier governments, their representation to 
the central legislature and the assignment of policy 
responsibilities between the center and lower tiers. 
Whatever federal constitution is selected will have 
implications for the valued goals of government: 
efficiency, political participation and protection of rights 
(60).  
 
 
The second-generation theory (SGT) of fiscal 
federalism 
 
Under the concepts of public choice and political economy 
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that focuses on political processes and the behavior of 
political actors, the SGT began to develop. Unlike the 
first-generation theory (FGT) which largely assumed that 
public administrators work hard on achieving the common 
good, the SGT revolves around the willingness of the 
public to participate in political processes (both voters 
and officials) have their own objectives and purposes that 
they work hard to maintain in a political setting that 
provides the constraints on their efforts. New public 
management (NPM) is a theory of governance that is 
heavily influenced by market theory and economic 
decision-making, public choice, principal agent theory 
and transaction cost economics in particular (Hood, 1991; 
Kaboolian, 1998), rather than civic choices. 
Ostrom and Ostrom (1971) as advocates of public 
choice, point to what they, see as Wilson’s major thesis 
statement: “but there is one rule of good administration 
for all governments alike. So far as administrative 
functions are concerned, all governments have a strong 
structural likeness more than if they are to be uniformly 
useful and efficient, and they must have a strong 
structural likeness” (Wilson, 1887). The authors 
emphasize that by good administration Wilson meant 
order of hierarchy in a rank system subject to political 
direction. The ranks will be a corps of technically trained 
civil servants; Wilson wanted them schooled and drilled 
“after appointment, into a perfected organization, with an 
appropriate hierarchy and characteristic discipline” 
(Wilson, 1887). 
Locke’s theory of self-interest has its own 
consequences in the field. One of the major founders of 
the national performance review, Kamensky (1996), 
states that the new public management is connected with 
the public choice movement whose central backbone is 
that “all human behavior is dominated by self-interest”. 
In addition, the SGT have evolved due to the 
information revolution in the age of globalization and 
financial crisis in the various countries all over the world. 
Information is power and the outcomes from collective-
choice institutions depend in basic ways on the 
information that the various organizations and actors 
possess. In settings of asymmetric information, where 
some business partners or entities have knowledge of 
such things as preferences, cost functions, or effort, 
knowledge, governments alone cannot decide alone on 
how to draw their financial policies. The SGT is revolving 
around this information and how it can be obtained, 
analyzed and used to draw better well-framed federal 
fiscal policies (Oates, 2005).  
The origins of the etymology of the term governance 
the authors claim are of two traditions, the study of 
institutions (multi layered structural context) including 
public choice; the second tradition is network theory (role 
of multiple social actors in networks). As O’Toole (1997) 
has shown, the phenomenon of networks has added 
intersubjectivity and interdependence, and a need for 
collaboration among  actors  with  differing  and  at  times  
 
 
 
 
conflicting interests and motivations. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper aimed to present some of the discourse and 
thought on the subject of fiscal federalism. The 
conclusion presented by Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) 
seems to pull the idea together. There is variation, there 
are political, environmental, social dynamics taking place 
within and across countries and throughout the globe. 
The theory of fiscal federalism seem to point to beneficial 
economic outcomes, yet it is not a definite replacement; 
under certain conditions at certain times it more 
centralization seems appropriate. Therefore, the question 
is not whether decentralization is beneficial, but rather 
when and to what degree? As was pointed in few places 
in the paper the written agreement (constitution) of the 
legislature is the key to the beginning of the conversation. 
Perhaps as technological, social, economic and political 
elements change within a country so should the degree 
of decentralization. Economically speaking, each county 
should strive to the utmost degree of decentralization as 
possible to most efficient, and to be as close to the 
current preferences of the citizenry, as suggested by 
Oates (1972). 
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